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Prosecuting Lemkin’s Concept of Genocide: Successes and Controversies
Jonathan Hobson

University of Gloucestershire
Cheltenham, England

Introduction
As a term, genocide is a relatively recent concept devised by the lawyer Raphaël Lemkin in 1944
as a response to the organized, mechanized, and institutionalized killings that were an integral
part of the Nazi regime during the Second World War. For Lemkin, Genocide was “an old practice
in its modern development.”1 It was not that the killings were necessarily greater in number
than previous events of mass murder, or that the cultural imperialism they reflected was a new
phenomenon in Europe. Rather, that the systems, structures, and technologies of modernity enabled
the Nazis to undertake a process of isolation, denigration, and destruction in a more organized and
orchestrated way that had happened previously. The destruction, not limited to but particularly
targeted at the Jewish population of occupied Europe saw systematic abuse, disempowerment,
cultural destruction and the murder of millions, many in purpose-built death camps. For Lemkin,
this industrialization of the processes of discrimination and killing required a new language:
New conceptions require new terms. By genocide we mean the destruction of a nation or
ethnic group … a coordinated plan of different actions aimed at the destruction of essential
foundations of life of national groups, with the aim of the destruction of the group themselves.2

Genocide is more than mass murder and cultural and economic domination: it is the biological,
cultural, and social disintegration of a targeted group. In his work detailing the new terminology of
genocide, Lemkin3 describes the “techniques of genocide” in different spheres of human existence,
and particularly in relation to the conditions of life brought to bear on Jews in Nazi Germany. For
Lemkin, the Nazi genocide was a planned and deliberate attempt to undermine and then destroy
the Jewish population in all aspects of life: political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical,
religious, and moral. It was, as he described it, “an elaborate, almost scientific system, developed
to an extent never before achieved by any nation.”4
Subsequently codified by the United Nations in 1951, Genocide has become the focus of several
international courts including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
in 1993, the International criminal tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994, and the International Criminal
Court (ICC) founded in 1998. These legal bodies represent a voice for the international community
and a statement of intent when it comes to collective action on the continued perpetration of a
crime that should “shock the conscience of humanity.”5
The international bodies responsible for prosecuting genocide are not without their critics. For
instance, the professor of international Law, William Schabas,6 identifies issues with the definitions
of genocide used in international legislation. Barria and Roper7 are skeptical on the impact of the
early international tribunals in both prosecuting individuals and in contributing to more lasting
peace in the regions. There are also critiques on the role that the International Criminal Court in
1 Raphaël Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposal for Redress
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), 79.
2 Ibid., 79.
3 Ibid., 83.
⁴ Ibid., 84.
⁵ United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. July 17, 1998 and corrected by process-verbaux of
November 10, 1998, July 12, 1999, November 30, 1999, May 8, 2000, January 17, 2001 and January 16, 2002 (UN Doc. A/
CONF.183/9).
⁶ William Schabas, Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (United Nations Audiovisual
Library of International Law, 2008), accessed June 10, 2018, http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/cppcg/cppcg_e.pdf.
⁷ Lilian Barria and Steven Roper, “How Effective are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and the
ICTR,” International Journal of Human Rights 9, no. 3 (2005), 349-368.
Jonathan Hobson. “Prosecuting Lemkin’s Concept of Genocide: Successes and Controversies” Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, 1
(2019): 19-32. ©2019 Genocide Studies and Prevention.
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sovereign states, particularly in Africa, where Abdul Tejan-Cole8 argues that the work of the ICC
in Africa has opened it up to criticisms of neo-colonialism on that continent. This is a position
taken by the African Union, who have persistently criticized the ICCs involvement in African
Affairs and have gone as far as to recommend that its member states do not comply with ICC
arrest warrants. Nevertheless, many argue that the international tribunals and the ICC have had a
significant and positive impact. For instance, Hyeran and Simmons,9 Bassiouni and Hansen,10 and
Hillebrecht11 all see the prosecutions and the wider work of the international tribunals and courts
as an opportunity to establish international norms around prosecuting genocide, changing habits
and deterring, or at least dampening the extent of future genocidal events. This paper examines the
impact of international efforts towards prosecuting genocide, considering the legislative journey
the crime has been through, the prosecutions for genocide to date, and the difficulties around the
politicization of the international courts.
Structure and Data
The paper is in three parts. The first part examines the history of genocide legislation, in particular
the international legal frameworks established since Lemkin first devised the term in 1944. The
second part details the extent of genocide prosecutions to date, employing material from various
international criminal tribunals, the ICC, national courts, and, where necessary, media accounts
contemporary with the events. The final part illustrates the politics involved in genocide prosecutions
through a case study of ICC involvement in Africa and the failed extradition of Sudanese president
Omar Al Bashir. The case study uses a range of secondary sources, including documents from the
ICC, the African Union, National Governments, and other contemporary accounts.
Legislating Genocide: From Lemkin to the ICC
The first significant appearance of the term genocide after Lemkin’s inception of the term in 1944
was during the trials in Nuremburg and Tokyo after the Second World War. These trials were
based on two important pieces of legislation: the “Charter of the International Military Tribunal”,
which was presented in June 1945 and formed the basis for the trials of Nazi party members at
Nuremburg,12 and in September 1945, the “International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter,”
which was the basis for trials of Japanese prisoners in Tokyo. The subsequent prosecutions were
in part the realization of the “Moscow Declaration” (and subsequent “London agreement,” both
more commonly associated with the establishment of the United Nations) signed on October 30,
1943, on behalf of the Governments of the United Kingdom, United States, Soviet Union, and
Nationalist China. These declarations promised a “rapid and orderly transition from war to peace
and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security.”13
The legislation adopted as part of the trials at Nuremburg and Tokyo were important for
several reasons. Common to both trials was a list of three crimes: crimes against peace, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity,14 one of the first occasions on which such serious acts of widespread
violence, aggression, and destruction were codified at an international level. Although the term
genocide was not listed as a crime at either trial, it was referred to during the hearings. More
broadly, both trials contributed to the concept of achievable international justice and standards
⁸ Abdul Tejan-Cole, “Is the ICC’s exclusively African case docket a legitimate and appropriate intervention or an unfair
targeting of Africans?,” in Contemporary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court, ed. Richard H. Steinberg (Leiden:
Brill, 2016), 366-379.
⁹ Jo Hyeran and Beth Simmons, “Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?” International Organization 70, no. 3
(2016), 443-475.
10

M. Cherif Bassiouni and Douglass Hansen, “The Inevitable Practice of the Office of the Prosecutor,” in Contemporary
Issues Facing the International Criminal Court, ed. Richard H. Steinberg (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 309-325.

11

Courtney Hillebrecht, “The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal Court: Evidence from Libya,” International
Interactions 42, no. 4 (2016), 616-643.

12

United Nations, The Charter and Judgment of the Nürnberg Tribunal – History and Analysis, Memorandum submitted by the
Secretary-General, Formulation of the Nürnberg Principles, 1949. (UN Doc. A/CN.4/5).

13

United Nations, The Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-17 (New York: United Nations Publications, 1947), 3.

14

United Nations, Charter.
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around serious crimes that constituted violations of individual and collective liberties. The Charter
and judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal included a series of “Principles of International Law”
that were subsequently adopted by the International Law Commission of the United Nations, in
1950.15 This codified the three crimes considered at Nuremburg and Tokyo into international statute
and set out the criteria for holding to account those responsible. It also sought to determine several
questions of international criminal jurisdiction, including for the crime of “genocide,” specifically:
…the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial
of persons, charged with genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred
upon that organ by international convention.16

The inclusion of the term genocide in the text from the International Law Commission was
a significant milestone in the recognition and management of the crime. At the same time as
Nuremburg, in Tokyo the United Nations was running a parallel conference debating Lemkin’s
term genocide in relation to the crimes committed in the Far East during the Second World War.
This conference culminated in the “Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide,” which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1948, and
enacted in law 12 January 1951.17 This legislation, based on the work of Lemkin, defined Genocide
in legal terms as:
… Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(e) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(f) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.18

The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide was the first human rights
treaty adopted by the United Nations General assembly. It uses much of the same language
and precedents set out in the “Principles of International Law” recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, particularly around the culpability of perpetrators and the responsibility of
the international community in prosecuting the crime.
Although there is some evidence to show that the term genocide was used in at least one
successful prosecution before 1990, in Equatorial Guinea (as detailed in next section of this paper),
it is generally accepted that the legislation governing genocide was not acted upon, certainly at an
international level, until the early 1990s when the United Nations used the Genocide Convention
to establish the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda
(ICTY and ICTR). There are several reasons for this period of inactivity, chief among them was
the international paralysis caused by the Cold War, lack of consensus across the UN, and, as
Schabas19 points out, a practical difficulty in that “the Genocide Convention does not establish a
monitoring mechanism.” Nevertheless, in 1993 the United Nations established the International

15

United Nations, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1950, Vol. 2 (New York: United Nations Publication, 1957),
374-378.

16

Ibid., 378.

17

United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 260, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
December 9, 1948 (UN Doc. A/RES/260(III)).

18

United Nations, Convention, 278.

19

Schabas, Convention, 5.
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Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia20 with a mandate to prosecute those responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law during the break-up of the former Yugoslavia,
including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war,
crimes against humanity, and genocide. Then, in 1994 following the brutal and violent civil war,
the United Nations established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, charged with
prosecuting a similar range of crimes (UNHCR 2016). The ICTR ended its work on December 25,
2015, whilst that of the ICTY continues.
Although the ICTY and ICTR were the first international use of the genocide conventions,
Schabas21 is somewhat circumspect about the application of the legislation in these courts, describing
“a restrictive approach to interpretation of the definition of genocide, which was made evident in
the two ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.” This critique is supported by
Barria and Roper, who identify a range of difficulties with ICTY and ICTR, for example that some
of the “problems of the tribunals are due to the nature of international humanitarian law and
their broad mandate.”22 This is not to say that these tribunals were without merit; it is important
to note that they did signify a willingness on the part of the international community to focus on
some of the most extreme cases of state-sanctioned and organized violence. Nevertheless, it was
some of the perceived failings of the ICTY and ICTR that were part of the “primary justifications
for the creation of an International Criminal Court”23 as a more permanent body to oversee the
prosecution of the crime of genocide.
Enacted on July 1, 2002, the Rome Statue established the International Criminal Court (ICC)
with jurisdiction over Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, and War Crimes, “the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community.”24 The ICC is funded on a similar model to the
UN, where contributions are based roughly on member states’ GDP. 18 judges are elected by the
Assembly of States Parties for nine years, currently: Argentina, Dominican Republic, Trinidad
and Tobago, Kenya, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Belgium, Italy, United
Kingdom, Czech Republic, France, Poland, Germany, Hungary, Japan, and Republic of Korea, the
Philippines.25 Investigations are initiated based on a referral from the UN Security Council, from a
petition by a State, or through an ICC investigation initiated by the Office of the Prosecutor.26 The
next section of this paper details the successes of genocide prosecution worldwide, providing the
sum of prosecutions to date and the organizations or bodies responsible for those prosecutions.
Prosecuting Genocide: Contested Success
As of January 1, 2018, there have been 150 identifiable prosecutions for genocide, although in 7 cases
those found guilty were subsequently acquitted. These are prosecutions that have listed genocide
as at least one of the offenses for which an individual has been found guilty. In many cases there are
other offenses alongside genocide convictions, most commonly Crimes against Humanity or grave
breaches of the international laws governing war (i.e. serious breaches of the Geneva Convention),
however these are not detailed in the following lists. The convictions for genocide are organized
into three groups: those pursuant to the war in the Rwanda (Table 1); those pursuant to the war in
the former Yugoslavia (Table 2); cases across the rest of the world, including those from the ICC
(Table 3). In the first two groups many of the convictions came through the work of the ICTY and
ICTY. Despite the criticisms of these courts, they both have successfully prosecuted individuals for
20

United Nations, Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, September 2009,
compilation based on original United Nations resolutions, accessed October 6, 2018, http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal
Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf, 278.

21

Schabas, Convention, 4.

22

Barria and Roper, Effective, 364.

23

Ibid., 349.

24

United Nations, Rome Statute, 2.

25

International Criminal Court, “Current Judges,” Judicial Divisions, accessed October 6, 2018, https://www.icc-cpi.int/
about/judicial-divisions/biographies.

26

International Criminal Court, “Understanding the International Criminal Court,” Public Information and
Documentation Section, accessed October 6, 2018, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/pids/publications/uicceng.pdf, 17.
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the crime of genocide, with the ICTR is responsible for the largest number of individual genocide
trials, and for 59 convictions.
Each table lists convictions in that group by prosecuting body and in chronological order,
combining convictions together where prosecuting bodies have done so. The tables identify the
specific crime for which individuals were convicted, the sentence they received, and whether
that sentence was reduced, commuted or overturned on appeal. Each table is followed by some
discussion on issues of importance. Where sentences are listed as “Life” this reflects the term given
by the specific court and may vary depending on the legislation used in each case.
Table 1. Genocide Prosecutions Pursuant to the War in Rwanda
Table Key: Description of genocide conviction
(i) Genocide
(ii) Conspiracy to commit genocide
(iii) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide
(iv) Complicity in genocide

Prosecutions by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
Date

Name(s)

Conviction

Sentence

Sept 1998

Jean-Paul Akayesu

(i) (iii)

Life

Sept 1998

Jean Kambanda

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

Life

Feb 1999

Omar Serushago

(i)

15 years

May 1999

Clément Kayishema ; Obed Ruzindana

(i)

Life; 25 years (respectively)

Dec 1999

Georges Rutaganda

(i)

Life

Jan 2000

Alfred Musema

(i)

Life

June 2000

Georges Ruggiu

(iii)

12 years

Feb 2003

Elizaphan Ntakirutimana ; Gérard Ntakirutimana

(i)

10 years and 25 years
(respectively)

May 2003

Eliézer Niyitegeka

(i) (ii) (iii)

Life

May 2003

Laurent Semanza

(iv)

35 years

Dec 2003

Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza ; Ferdinand Nahimana ;
Hassan Ngeze

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

32 ; 30 ; 35 years (respectively)

Dec 2003

Juvénal Kajelijeli

(i) (iii)

45 years

Jan 2004

Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda

(i) (iii)

Life

Feb 2004

Samuel Imanishimw

(i)

12 years

June 2004

Sylvestre Gacumbitsi

(i)

30 years

July 2004

Emmanuel Ndindabahizi

(i)

Life

April 2005

Mikaeli Muhimana

(i)

Life

Dec 2005

Aloys Simba

(i)

25 years

Dec 2006

Athanase Seromba

(i)

Life

Dec 2007

François Karera

(i)

Life

Nov 2008

Siméon Nchamihigo

(i)

40 years

Dec 2008

Théoneste Bagosora ; Aloys Ntabakuze ; Anatole
Nsengiyumva

(i)

35 years each (Nsengiyumva
reduced to 15 years on appeal)

Dec 2008

Simon Bikindi

(iii)

15 years

©2019
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Table 1. continued.
Dec 2008

Protais Zigiranyirazo

(i)

Life (subsequently acquitted)

Nov 2008

Siméon Nchamihigo

(i)

40 years

Feb 2009

Emmanuel Rukundo

(i)

23 years

June 2009

Callixte Kalimanzira

(i) (iii)

25 years

July 2009

Tharcisse Renzaho

(i)

Life

Sept 2009

Michel Bagaragaza

(iv)

8 years

Feb 2010

Tharcisse Muvunyi

(iii)

15 years

Feb 2010

Ephrem Setako

(i)

25 years

July 2010

Yussuf Munyakazi

(i)

25 years

Aug 2010

Dominique Ntawukulilyayo

(i)

20 years

Nov 2010

Gaspard Kanyarukiga

(i)

30 years

Dec 2010

Ildephonse Hategekimana

(i)

Life

Mar 2011

Jean Baptiste Gatete

(i)

40 years

May 2011

Augustin Ndindiliyimana ; Augustin Bizimungu

(i)

11 years (subsequently
acquitted); 30 years
(respectively)

June 2011

Pauline Nyiramasuhuko; Arsène Shalom Ntahobali;
Sylvain Nsabimana; Alphonse Nteziryayo; Joseph
kanyabashi; Élie Ndayambaje

(i)

Life, life, 25, 30, 35, life
(subsequently acquitted)
(respectively)

Sept 2011

Justin MugenzI ; Prosper Mugiraneza

(ii) (iii)

30 years each (both
subsequently acquitted)

Dec 2011

Grégoire Ndahimana

(i)

25 years

Feb 2012

Édouard Karemera ; Matthieu Ngirumpats

(i) (ii) (iii)

Life

May 2012

Callixte Nzaboniman

(i) (ii) (iii)

Life

June 2012

Ildéphonse Nizeyimana

(i)

35 years

June 2012

Joseph Serugendo

(iii)

6 years

Dec 2012

Augustin Ngirabatware

(i) (iii)

30 years

Date

Name(s) and prosecutor

Conviction

Sentence

Feb 1997

Froduald Karamira
Court of First Instance of Kigali, Rwanda

(i)

Death

June 2001

Vincent Nteziman ; lphonse Higaniro; Sister
Gertrude (a.k.a. Consolata Mukangango) ; Sister
Kisito a.k.a. Julienne Mukabutera)
Boutare Four trial: Assize Court , Belgium

(i)

12 years; 20 years; 15 years; 12
years (respectively)

Nov 2006

Wenceslas Munyeshyaka (tried in absentia)
Rwandan Military Court, Kigali

(i)

Life

Mar 2009

Béatrice Nirere
“Gagcaca” Court of Giporoso, Gasabo District,
Rwanda

(i)

Life

Oct 2009

Désiré Munyaneza
Superior Court, Criminal Division, Canada

(i)

Life

Other prosecutions for Genocide committed in Rwanda
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Table 1. continued.
Dec 2009

Valérie Bemeriki
“Gagcaca” Court of Nyakabanda, Kigali, Rwanda

(i)

Life

June 2010

François Bazaramba
District Court of Porvoo, Finland

(i)

Life

Mar 2014

Pascal Simbikangwa
The Assize Court of Paris, France

(iv)

25 years

Dec 2015

Jean Uwinkindi Rwandan High Court

(i)

Life

April 2017

Bernard Munyagishari
Rwandan High Court

(i)

Life

As table 1 shows, as well as a considerable number of trials conducted by the ICTR, the Rwandan
Government in various courts also tried those responsible for Genocide. Although table 1 reflects
the largest number of cases, this is by no means the sum of all trials relating to genocide in Rwanda.
Between 1997 and 2004, 10,026 cases were tried by the national courts system under a new form of
“Organic Law,” devised specifically to deal with the post-genocide trials.27 Organic law split cases
into four categories, with the most serious, Category 1, referring directly to those “whose criminal
acts or criminal participation place among planners, organizers, imitators, supervisors of the crime
of genocide or crime against humanity,”28 some of these are captured in the table above. Categories
2, 3, and 4 include crimes where the accused are complicit, accomplices, or perpetrators of acts of
violence associated to crimes that may include genocide.
Given the difficulties of trying the substantial number of those incarcerated and awaiting
trial, in 2004 the Rwandan government developed the gacaca system of localized, community
trials that were a “relatively informal, traditional Rwandan method of conflict resolution that was
adapted to meet the discerned needs of the post-genocide environment.”29 The gacaca courts dealt
predominantly with Category 2, 3 and 4 cases under Organic Law, and Nwoye30 describes the
process as “a result of the domestic system’s inability to deal with the huge number of back-logged
genocide cases promptly.” According to Human Rights Watch, of the roughly 818,000 individuals
accused of crimes in the initial gacaca phase between 2004-5, 77,000 were initially placed in Organic
Law Category 1 to be tried in the national court system, with the remainder of the cases sent to the
gacaca courts.31 As of April 2012, approximately 1,951,388 cases had been tried in the gacaca system,
with a conviction rate running around 65%. The trials of political and military leaders for acts of
genocide are generally well documented and included in Table 1, however there are a multitude
of other crimes associated with the genocide, such as the localized support, complicity, and/or
conspiracy to commit genocide that are not included in official figures but were part of national or
gacaca trials. Therefore, it is very difficult to provide a firm number of the broader set of convictions
related to genocide that came from these processes, but it is certain that many individuals were
convicted of such crimes.
As with the war in Rwanda, the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia resulted in convictions
for crimes of genocide. Table 2 shows these convictions, including those rating to the ICTY and
convictions from other courts.
27

Leo C. Nwoye, “Partners or Rivals in Reconciliation? The ICTR and Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts,” San Diego International
Law Journal 16, no. 1 (2014), 184.

28

Republic of Rwanda, Organic Law No. 40/2000, January 26, 2001, accessed October 6, 2018, http://jurisafrica.org/docs/
statutes/ORGANIC%20LAW%20N0%2040.pdf.

29

Nwoye, Partners, 125.

30
31

Ibid., 183.
Human Rights Watch, “Law and Reality: Progress in Judicial Reform in Rwanda,” accessed October 6, 2018, https://
www.hrw.org/report/2008/07/25/law-and-reality/progress-judicial-reform-rwanda.
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Table 2. Genocide Prosecutions Pursuant to the War in Former Yugoslavia.
Table Key: Description of genocide conviction
(i) Genocide
(ii) Conspiracy to commit genocide
(iii) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide
(iv) Complicity in genocide
(v) Aiding and abetting genocide

Prosecutions by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
Date

Name(s)

Conviction

Sentence

April 2004

Radislav Krstić

(v)

35 years

June 2010

Vujadin Popović

(i) (ii)

Life

June 2010

Ljubiša Beara

(i)

Life

June 2010

Drago Nikolić

(v)

35 years

Dec 2012

Zdravko Tolimir

(i) (ii)

Life

Mar 2016

Radovan Karadžić

(i)

40 years

Nov 2017

Ratko Mladić

(i)

Life

Date

Name and prosecutor

Conviction

Sentence

Sept 1997

Nikola Jorgić
German Higher Court

(i)

Life

Mar 1993

Borislav Herak
Sarajevo Military District Court

(i)

Death (subsequently revised
to 20 years)

Mar 1993

Sretko Damjanović
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, War Crimes
Chamber

(i)

Death (subsequently
acquitted)

Nov 1999

Maksim Sokolović
German Higher Court

(v)

9 years

Oct 2009

Milorad Trbić
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, War Crimes
Chamber

(i)

30 years

Other Prosecution for Genocide Committed in the Former Yugoslavia

Although the ICTR and ICTY are responsible for the largest number of identifiable genocide
convictions, there have been convictions across the rest of the world. The first convictions for
genocide are often credited to the ICTY and ICTR, however almost 20 years earlier, in 1979, there
were several successful prosecutions for Genocide arising from the military coup in Equatorial
Guinea. These prosecutions are often discounted over questions on the legality of the court and
the legal basis used to define Genocide. The trial in Equatorial Guinea used a definition for
genocide developed a few years earlier in a Spanish military court, and although the Spanish case
was ultimately dismissed, the supreme military court of Equatorial Guinea used this definition
as part of their prosecution of the former president and six other high-ranking officials in a set
of trials after the coup. The sole international observer of the trial, Alejandro Artucio who was
present on behalf of the International Commission of Jurists, cast doubt on the trial for “a series of
irregularities” during the proceedings.32 He argues that the charges of genocide were not legally
valid, as Equatorial Guinea had not ratified the 1948 convention on the prevention and punishment
of genocide. Furthermore, he argues that the charges of genocide, particularly the intent to destroy
a religious, national or racial group, were not proven in the case, but rather the terms “genocide and
32

Alejandro Artucio, The Trial of Macias in Equatorial Guinea: The Story of a Dictatorship (Geneva: International Commission
of Jurists, 1979), 56.
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mass murder were used synonymously.”33 Nevertheless, the neglect of the Equatorial Guinea case
represents an unfair erasure; it was the first time in which a legally defined concept of genocide
was successfully prosecuted. During the trials in Equatorial Guinea genocide was cited as a crime,
with a definition based on the prior Spanish civil and military definition. Despite the irregularities
identified by the Artucio, the convictions in Equatorial Guinea have a genuine case to be regarded
as the first for genocide. These convictions are included in Table 3 along with cases from elsewhere
in the world.
Table 3. Genocide Prosecutions Pursuant to Cases in the Rest of the World
Table Key: Description of genocide conviction
(i)
Genocide
(ii) Conspiracy to commit genocide
(iii) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide
(iv) Complicity in genocide
Date

Name(s) and prosecutor

Conviction

Sentence

Sept 1979

Equatorial Guinea
Francisco Macías Guema (Former president Equatorial
guinea) ; Pastor Nsue ;Salvador Ondo Ela ; Fortunate
Nsogo ; Eduardo Nguema Edu ; Miguel Eyegue ;
Bienvenido Micha Nsue
The Supreme Military Council of Editorial Guinea

(i)

Death

Dec 2006

Ethiopia
Mengistu Haile Mariam (former President of Ethiopia) ;
Legesse Asfaw, known as “the butcher of Tigre”; former
vice-president Fisseha Desta ; former prime minister
Fikresellassie Wogderes; 51 other defendants
Ethiopian High Court

(i)

Death (a number of the
co-defendants not named
here had this sentence
commuted later)

June 2007

Iraq War (Early 2000’s)
Ali Hasan Al-Majid (a.k.a. “Chemical Ali”) ; Sultan Hashim
Ahmad Al-Ta”i ; Sabir Aziz Husayn -al-Duri ; Husayn
Rashid Muhammad ; Farhan Mutlak Al-Juburi
Iraqi High Tribunal (Second Criminal Court)

(i)

Ali Hasan Al-Majid ; Sultan
Hashim Ahmad Al-Ta”i ;
Husayn Rashid Muhammad
- Death
Sabir Aziz Husayn; Farhan
Mutlak Al-Juburi - Life

May 2013

Guatamala
Efraín Ríos Montt (General and de facto President of
Guatamala)
High Risk Tribunal A, Guatemala

(i)

80 years in prison, fifty of
which for Genocide (Trial
and verdict nullified by
Guatemalan Constitutional
Court after 10 days)

Although there have been a number of successful trials, the relatively low number of convictions
outside of the Rwanda context highlight the difficulty of achieving successful prosecution in a
crime as complicated as genocide, where a dolus specialis (particular intent) of group destruction
must be proven.34 This is not the only difficulty in genocide prosecution; the realpolitik of criminal
justice, particularly at an international level, is such that the intentional bodies investigating and
trying Genocide have come under considerable scrutiny and, at times, heavy criticism. The next
33

Ibid., 31.

34

Jonathan Hobson, “Three Theoretical Approaches to Lemkin’s Definition of Genocide,” Genocide Studies and Prevention
13, no. 1 (2019), 11-18.

©2019

Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.1.1640

Hobson

28

section discusses some of difficulties in achieving prosecutions, using the work of ICC in Africa
and the case of Sudanese present Omar Al Bashir as an example.
The Politics of Genocide Prosecution: A Case Study on the ICC in Africa
Of the 124 countries that are parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, 34 are African states and many
of these were “deeply involved in creating the Court and all its provisions.”35 Nevertheless, there
has been a persistent critique of the ICCs role in Africa, much of this from a number of African
States claiming that the Court “has preoccupied itself with Africa and failed to investigate equally
severe conflicts elsewhere.”36 Table 4 shows the history of ICC cases, illustrating a preponderance
of cases in Africa. Although genocide is listed in several of the cases, convictions to date have been
restricted to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Table 4. ICC Cases up to January 2018
Africa

Asia

Europe

North America

South America

Investigations not taken to
preliminary examination

0

1

0

1

1

Investigations taken to preliminary
examination

4

2

3

0

1

Situations currently under
investigation

10

0

1

0

0

4

0

0

0

0

5

0

0

0

0

3

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

0

0

In Trial
Acquitted or charges not confirmed
Convicted
Convicted but in Appeal

Source: ICC, 2018b

There is a spectrum of positions on the ICCs role in Africa, ranging from accusations of western
neo-colonialism to the application of legislation governing intervention. In the first instance, Abdul
Tejan-Cole,37 Executive Director of the Open Society Initiative for West Africa, explains how some
have gone so far as “to accuse the Court of being a neo-colonialist institution peddling a Western
agenda that seeks to control African politics through ICC investigations and prosecutions.” For
example, Courtenay Griffiths, the lead defense attorney for former Liberian President Charles
Taylor, argued that rather than operating through a desire for international justice, the ICC is acts
as “a vehicle for its primarily European funders, of which the UK is one of the largest, to exert their
power and influence, particularly in Africa.”38
Less critical, but still unfavorable interpretations of the ICCs role in Africa assert that
the “Achilles heel of the ICC system revolves around the fairness of its selection process of its
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cases.”39 Such arguments claim that the ICC suffers from selectivism when deciding which cases
to investigate and prosecute. There may be many reasons for this, but Imoedemhe40 argues that
geopolitical pressures mean that “international crimes are ignored when it is considered politically
expedient to do so,” and African cases are less likely to have the geopolitical influence to assert
pressure to this extent.
Counter arguments to the claims of neo-colonialism and selectivism focus on the application of
Complementarity in the Rome Statue, the principle that stipulates that that it is first and foremost
“the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes.”41 Under the complementarity argument, the clustering of cases in Africa is not seen as
delierate, but a consequence of histrorical events such as colonialism, war, and “impunity that
thrives in a lack of accountability and the rule of law.”42 Under the complementarity principle, the
argument is that clustering of cases in Africa is not deliberate, but a consequence of a historical
events such as colonialism, wars, and “impunity that thrives in a lack of accountability and the
rule of law.”43 For those that take this position, such as deGuzman, the ICC is simply doing its job,
and “all of the Court’s actions to date have been based on plausible interpretations of the relevant
law.”44
One of the most persistent critics of the ICC is the African Union, and an example of this is
the dispute over arrest warrants issued for heads of state of African Union Countries, particulary
Sudanese present Omar Al Bashir. At its July 2010 summit, the African union responded to a second
arrest warrant for Omar Al Bashir for Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity by
requesting that its member states did not cooperate with the ICC.”45 This position was reinforced at
an Extraordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in October 2013, where the African Union stated
its “concern on the politicization and misuse of indictments against African leaders” reaffirming
its position that “no charges shall be commenced or continued before any International Court or
Tribunal against any serving AU Head of State or Government.”46 In 2015, the African Union’s
Committee of African Ministers on International Criminal Court again reiterated their commitment
to terminate, suspend, or defer the proceedings against President Al Bashir of Sudan and Deputy
President William Samoei Ruto of Kenya until the “concerns and proposals for amendments of
the Rome Statute of the ICC are considered.47 Since the initial arrest warrant in 2009, Al Bashir
has visited eight African states that are signatories to the Rome Statute of the ICC without arrest:
Chad, Kenya, Djibouti, Malawi, Nigeria, DRC, South Africa and Uganda. Boehme48 suggests this
has effectively created a “non-cooperation norm” for exercising ICC warrants in Africa.
As well as the collective opposition from the African Union, individual African states have
expressed concerns with the workings of ICC. On October 12, 2016, the Parliament of the Republic
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of Burundi voted in favor of withdrawing from the Rome Statute of the ICC.49 They are not the only
nation to have done so: South Africa, Kenya, and Gambia have all at some point indicated a desire
to withdraw from the statue. On October 27, 2017, Burundi became the first signatory to the Rome
Statue to leave the ICC.50
Despite the disagreements between the African Union, individual states, and the ICC, there is
still much support for the work of the court. For instance, Keppler51 claims that the African Union
“does not reflect the range of positions that African governments have regarding the ICC.” This
is supported by Boehme,52 who illustrates how the actions of the African Union created a loyalty
conflict in South Africa, where the executive is torn between “its obligation to the African Union
and its obligation to the ICC.” The South African government has been involved for several years
in a series of legal challenged around its withdrawal from the ICC, which was eventually found
by the high court to be “unconstitutional and invalid.”53 Furthermore, after South Africa’s 2016
proposed withdrawal from the ICC, Nigeria, DRC, Ivory Coast, Botswana, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali,
Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Lesotho, and Uganda all publicly backed the Court and its work in Africa.
Although the ICC faces a difficult role in Africa, there are many who believe “the relationship
is still salvageable and could be enhanced for the mutual benefit of both institutions with a view to
achieving the goal of peace and security.”54 Despite an overbalance in ICC cases in Africa, Bassiouni
and Hansen argues that this does not mean the ICC should cease investigations here, but that “it
needs also to investigate and prosecute crimes elsewhere.”55 As table 4 shows, there is evidence that
the ICC is increasingly focusing its work outside of the African context, with 6 of the 10 preliminary
cases in other continents. The only current ICC case pursuant to genocide, however, is in Africa.
Summary
Since Lemkin’s inception of the crime, definitions for genocide have changed little. The subsequent
use of Lemkin’s crime in legation was, in the words of the Rome Statute, an international response
to the idea that there are some crimes so significant that they “shock the conscience of humanity.”56
Nevertheless, the legislation is relatively new and the international responses to genocide newer
still. Although the ICC has yet to convict anyone for genocide, previous convictions in international,
regional, and local courts, show that there is a desire to pursue those responsible or complicit in this
most serious of crimes. Furthermore, bodies such as the ICTR, ICTY, and the ICC have a value that
can be judged alongside the number of convictions for genocide and other serious crimes. Hyeran
and Simmons argue that the work of the ICC is more nuanced than its record of prosecutions,
identifying “multiple mechanisms—legal and social, international and domestic—associated with
the ICC’s authority that can potentially deter law violation in countries prone to civil violence.”57
They identify two forms of mutually reinforcing deterrent:58 firstly, a prosecution deterrent that
derives from both the ICCs investigatory powers and from the integration into national laws of
the definitions on genocide and associated crimes used by the international courts; and secondly,
a social deterrent that derives from the ICCs representation of a mobilization in the international
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community and in domestic civil society. This is supported by Bassiouni and Hansen,59 who describe
the ICC as “an institution with the capacity to change habits and outcomes” and by Hillebrecht60
who argues that the “ICC’s involvement in conflict does have a dampening effect on the level of
mass atrocities committed.” Nevertheless, the presence of the ICC has not stopped what Lemkin
described over 70 years ago as “an old practice in its modern development.”61
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